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SECURITIES LAW
STANDING UNDER SECTION 13(d)
GAF Corp. v. Milstein
In 1968 Congress passed the Williams Act' which added to the
Securities Exchange Act of 19342 disclosure requirements for certain
acquisitions3 and cash tender offers. 4 In GAF Corp. v. Milstein5 the
I Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending Securities Exchange
Act §§ 12-14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n (1964).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1964).
8 Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. V, 1965-69) provided:
(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is registered pursuant to section 781 of
this title or any equity security issued by a closed-end investment company regis-
tered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of such class shall, within ten days
after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the security at its principal executive
office, by registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where the security is
traded, and file with the Commission, a statement containing such of the follow-
ing information, and such additional information, as the Commission may by
rules and regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors-
(A) the background and identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf
the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be
used in making the purchases, and if any part of the purchase price or proposed
purchase price is represented or is to be represented by funds or other considera-
tion borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or
trading such security, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties
thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan made in the ordinary course
of business by a bank, as defined in section 78c(a)(6) of this title, if the person
filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank shall not be made avail-
able to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which
such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or merge it
with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its business or
corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned, and
the number of shares concerning which there is a right to acquire, directly or
indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate of such person, giving the
name and address of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer, including but not limited
to transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan or option arrangements,
puts or calls, guaranties of profits, division of losses or profits, or the giving or
withholding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, arrange-
ments, or understandings have been entered into, and giving the details thereof.
Section 14(d), id. § 78n(d) required disclosure by tender offerors:
(I) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails
or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a
national securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender offer for, or a request
or invitation for tenders of, any class of any equity security which is registered
pursuant to section 781 of this title, or any equity security issued by a dosed-end
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, if,
after consummation thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be the
beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum of such class, unless at the time
copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent or given
to security holders such person has fied with the Commission a statement con-
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had its first opportunity to
consider the effect of the Williams Act in other than a tender offer
context.7 The court held that when existing security holders joined
together in a group so that the formation resulted in an aggregate
ownership in excess of 10 percent8 of a class of securities, the disclosure
requirements of section 13(d) were automatically triggered without any
further acquisitions or attempt to take control.9 In addition, the court
held that an issuer had standing under section 13(d) to seek injunctive
relief against utilization of the securities held by the group where the
disclosure report that had been filed was false.10 However, the court
refused to grant the issuer standing under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
to contest the fraudulent report in the absence of a purchase or sale of
securities by it.."
tamining such of the information specified in section 78m(d) of this tile, and such
additional information as the Commission may by rules and regulations prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4 Section 14(d)(8)(A) exempted tender offers where the consideration for the tender
was another security registered under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(8)(A)
(Supp. V, 1965-69). In addition, Section 14(e), id. § 78n(e), a general anti-fraud provision,
made it unlawful to file misleading reports pursuant to section 14(d).
In 1970, the Williams Act was amended, reducing the percentage of a class of securities
required to trigger sections 13(d) or 14(d) from 10 percent to 5 percent and deleting the
exemption of exchange offers from section 14. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84
Stat. 1497, amending Securities Exchange Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. V,
1965-69). For a thorough discussion of the Williams Act and its ramifications well beyond
the scope of this comment, see Griffin : Tucker, The Williams Act, Public Law 90-439-
Growing Pains? Some Interpretations with Respect to the Williams Act, 16 Iow. L.J. 654
(1971) [hereinafter Griffin & Tucker]; Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 131): Wild Card in the
Takeover Deck, N.Y.L.J., August 8-10, 1972 [hereinafter Robinson & Mahoney].
5453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
6The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Mansfield and Kaufman, who wrote the
unanimous opinion, and District Judge Levet, who sat by designation.
7 The Williams Act had previously been considered by the Second Circuit in the
tender offer situation in Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 425
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970) (exchange offer) and Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969) (cash tender offer). Section 13(d) had also
been considered by the Southern District in Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp.
891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) and Sisak v. Wings and Wheels Express, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,991 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
8 The 1970 Amendment reduced the -threshold to 5 percent. See text accompanying
note 3 supra.
9 453 F.2d at 718.
1o Id. at 719-21.
"Id. at 721-22. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), provides that it shall be un-
lawful
[to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission, promulgated at 17 C.F.R. § 240.
lob-5 (1972), further provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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GAF had commenced the action in the Southern District of New
York against members of the Milstein family, alleging that defendants
had violated sections 13(d), 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by failing to file a
timely, accurate disclosure of their aggregate holdings of GAF pre-
ferred stock.12 The individual defendants had received the stock, con-
stituting 10.25 percent of GAF's outstanding preferred, in May 1967
when the Ruberoid Company merged with GAF. A conspiracy was
allegedly entered into subsequent to the effective date of the Williams
Act13 for the purpose of taking over GAF, but defendants made no
further acquisitions of preferred stock.14 Defendants attempted to take
control of GAF but were ultimately defeated in a proxy contest in May
1971.1
The Second Circuit refused to follow the ruling in Bath Industries,
Inc. v. Blot,1 where the Seventh Circuit held that a group owning in
excess of 10 percent of a class of securities must file only when further
acquisitions are contemplated.' 7 The court in Milstein observed that
the statutory purpose of section 13(d) was to alert the marketplace to
any potential shift in the locus of voting power' s rather than merely
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any fa-
cility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
12 GAF preferred voted share for share with GAF common. 453 F.2d at 716 n.13.
Defendants filed their first report in September of 1970 but continually disclaimed any
intention to take over control of GAF.
13 July 29, 1968. The precise date when the conspiracy was formed was not alleged.
14The Milsteins did purchase GAF common but their holdings amounted to only
1.7 percent of the common stock outstanding.
15 453 F.2d at 714. The Milsteins attempted to infiltrate senior management positions.
They also filed derivative actions in the state and federal courts charging waste in an
effort to disparage management and depress the value of GAF stock. In addition, defen-
dants caused Circle Floor Co., Inc., a company in their control, to sell off its substantial
holdings in GAF, thereby further depressing GAF stock prices and facilitating acquisition
of control of plaintiff. GAF brought an antitrust action against Circle Floor Co., Inc.
and the Milsteins, alleging that defendants attempted to monopolize the manufacture and
contract installation of floor tile in the New York City metropolitan area. Dismissal of
the action was affirmed by the court of appeals. GAB Corp. v. Circle Floor Co., Inc., 168
N.Y.LJ. 27, Aug. 9, 1972 at 1, col. 7 (2d Cir. 1972).
16 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
17 In Bath plaintiff contended that the duty to file arose within 10 days of group
formation, whereas defendants asserted that it arose only after further acquisitions. The
Seventh Circuit took a middle course and held that disclosure was required within 10
days of agreement "to act in concert to acquire additional shares." 427 F.2d at 109 (em-
phasis in original). See Comment, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1136 (1970) in support of this rationale.
For criticism of the Bath holding, see Griffin & Tucker at 683-85.
18453 F.2d at 716. The legislative reports left no doubt in the court's mind as to
when a group would be required to file under section 13(d). Quoting the House and
Senate reports accompanying the Williams Act, the Second Circuit stated:
[Vol. 47:370
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to protect investors from the effect of volume transactions on price.1 9
The court felt that the intention to acquire additional shares after
formation was irrelevant. Although disclosure on formation might give
the target of a potential takeover a decided advantage where further
acquisitions are necessary to gain control, the formation itself could
present management with a fait accompli as "[i]t hardly can be ques-
tioned that a group holding sufficient shares can effect a takeover with-
out purchasing a single additional share of stock. 20
The court noted that requiring disclosure on mere formation
might create onerous burdens for a group whose formation does not
normally represent a potential shift in control, as in the case of a
management group or an institutional investor.21 However, the court
had defined "acquisition" in terms of voting control.22 Management
and investment groups normally obtain securities for their growth
potential rather than voting power. Such groups might nevertheless be
required to file if they agreed to exercise that aggregate voting power. 23
A disclosure requirement on mere formation could also sweep
informal groups within the Act's prohibitions. For example, section
13(d) might be applied to informal discussion among shareholders so
as to inhibit opposition to management at a shareholder's meeting.
This was a real fear in Bath24 and contributed to its "additional pur-
chase" rule.25 The Second Circuit rule would not give a court the
benefit of such an evidentiary aid in distinguishing the informal dis-
cussion of common issues from the actual formation of an insurgent
The group would be deemed to have become the beneficial owner, directly or
indirectly, of more than 10 percent of a class of securities at the time they agreed
to act in concert. Consequently, the group would be required to file the infor-
mation called for in section 13(d)(1) within 10 days after they agree to act to-
gether, whether or not any member of the group had acquired any securities
at that time.
Id., quoting S. RE'. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967); H.R. RP'. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8-9 (1968).
For a thorough treatment of the legislative history and statutory purpose of the
Williams Act, see Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership,
119 U. PA. L. Rnv. 853 (1971).
19 427 F.2d at 109.
20 453 F.2d at 718.
21 Id. at 719.
22 Id. at 716. The court was in accord with Bath on this point. In Bath the Seventh
Circuit quoted the language of the legislative reports:
"[Ojne who has the right to determine how the stock is voted has a beneficial
interest for the purposes of the Act."
427 F.2d at 112 (emphasis added).
23 The court felt such groups were not, per se, formed for the purposes of the Act
but it left open the question of disclosure requirements when management groups pooled
their interests to resist a takeover threat. 453 F.2d at 719 n.20. See Robinson & Mahoney
at 4, col. 3, arguing that they should file.
24 427 F.2d at 110.
25 At least under the Bath rule an actual conspiracy and attempt to wrest control
would be evidenced by additional security purchases. Id.
1972]
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group. However, in Milstein, no such additional evidence was necessary
to demonstrate the existence of a takeover group. Plaintiff's allegations
showed a conspiracy through acts other than additional purchases 6
and the court was bound, for the purposes of the appeal, to take these
allegations as true.27
It must be noted that the Milstein group was an informal arrange-
ment in which the individual members were not bound to vote their
shares as in a stock pool.28 Nor did the group itself ever have the right
to vote the shares as in a voting trust.2 9 Yet, both the Bath decision 0
and the legislative history3' require only persons who have the right to
vote the stock to file, since it is only they who pose a potential threat to
the status quo. The court recognized that it would not be necessary for
legal title to have been transferred to the group but, unless the group as
an entity could direct the voting of the stock held by its members, it
is arguable that the group, for the purposes of the Williams Act, never
"acquired" the GAF securities. The group, as an entity, never had an
enforceable right to vote, as would a purchaser in an executory contract
for the sale of securities or the holder of convertible securities or op-
tions.32
The court of appeals also held that GAF, as issuer of the securities
26 See note 15 supra.
27 In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
under FED. IL Crv. P. 12b(6), plaintiff's allegations are taken as true. See generally 2A J.
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrcE 12.08 (2d ed. 1968).
28 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw § 620(a) (McKinney 1963) which defines a stock pool-
ing agreement as:
An agreement between two or more shareholders, if in writing and signed by the
parties thereto [which provides] that in exercising any voting rights, the shares
held by them shall be voted as therein provided, or as they may agree, or as
determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon by them.
29 See, e.g., id. § 621 where both the legal title and the right to vote the shares are
transferred to the trustee.
30 On this point the Second Circuit agreed with Bath. See note 22 supra.
31 The legislative reports state that section 13(d) "would prevent a group of persons
who seek to pool their voting or other interests in the securities of any issuer from evading
the provisions of the statute because no one individual owns more than 10 percent of the
securities." S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1967). H.R. RaP. No. 1711, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1968) (emphasis added). In addition, the rules adopted by the Securities Ex-
change Commission require that in determining, for the purposes of sections 13(d) and
14(d), whether a person is the beneficial owner of securities, a person shall be deemed
to be an owner of securities "which such person has the right to acquire through the
exercise of presently exercisable options, warrants or rights or through conversion of
presently convertible securities, or otherwise." 17 C.F.P. § 240.13d-3 (1972) (emphasis
added). Finally, section 13(d)(1) requires disclosure only from a person "who [acquires],
directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security... ". 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(d)(1) (1964) (emphasis added). If ownership does not require legal title, then at least it
must require some measure of dominion and control. It is submitted that the only control
that the Milstein group, as an entity, could exercise over the voting of GAF securities was
familial in nature.
32 See generally Griffin & Tucker at 686-89.
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held by defendants, had standing under section 13(d),33 but not under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, to seek injunctive relief against the de-
fendants' voting their stock, or continuing in their efforts to gain
control. The court reaffirmed the Birnbaum doctrine 4 and held that
the issuer lacked standing under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to contest
the fraudulent filings in the absence of a purchase or sale of securities
by it.
There are, however, some recognized exceptions35 to the purchaser-
seller requirement of Birnbaum: (1) where the plaintiff can be treated
as a forced seller or a forced purchaser;38 or (2) where the plaintiff, as in
33 453 F.2d at 719-21. The court reasoned that, since the issuer was a required recipient
of the disclosure report, it was in an excellent position to police violations. In addition,
the issuer had both the resources and self-interest to bring section 13(d) actions. Moreover,
the court recognized a congressional intent in sections 14(d) and (e) to give an issuer
standing to resist tender offers where there are fraudulent disclosure reports. Section 13(d)
had been enacted as part of the same regulatory scheme and, therefore, an issuer should
have standing under it as well.
84 This doctrine, so-called because of its evolution from the Second Circuit's opinion
in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952), requires that, in order for a plaintiff to have standing under the general anti-fraud
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, he must have actually bought or sold securities
in reliance on the fraud.
In Birnbaum, plaintiff shareholder of Newport Steel Corporation sued the corporation
and its president who owned a controlling block of stock. Plaintiff alleged that the
defendant president had made fraudulent misrepresentations to the shareholders in an
effort to abort a tender-offer which would have been profitable to them so that defendant
could then consummate a highly profitable sale of his own stock to another corporation.
The court dismissed plaintiff's allegations under rule 10(b)-5:
Prior to its adoption the only prohibitions against fraud in the sale or purchase
of securities were contained in Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77q(a),
and § 15(c) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.CA. § 78o(c), Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act
only made it unlawful to defraud or deceive purchasers of securities, and Section
15(c) of the 1934 Act dealt only with fraudulent practices by security brokers or
dealers in over-the-counter markets, No prohibition existed against fraud on a
seller of securities by the purchaser if the latter was not a broker or a dealer.
Consequently, on May 21, 1942, the SEC adopted Rule X-10B-5 to close this ". ..
loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by
prohibiting individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230, May 21, 1942.
193 F.2d at 463 (emphasis in original).
35 See generally Kellogg, The Inability to Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing
to Sue Under Rule lOb-5 Is Involved, 20 BuoA.r.o L. REv. 93 (1970-71) [hereinafter Kel-
logg].
36 See, eg., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970) (standing under lOb-5 given to plaintiff who bought stock
to resist merger, was fraudulently defeated, and thus had to sell out); Vine v. Beneficial
Finance Co., Inc., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (standing given
to non-tendering shareholder where offeror fraudulently acquired 95 percent of targets
stock so as to permit a short-form merger with itself and thus force plaintiff to sell out).
Compare Crane, supra, with Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F.
Supp. 1128 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), appeal pending, [current] CCH FED. Sc. L. REP. 93,512
(2d Cir. 1972) (standing denied under 10b-5 to tender offeror who acquired shares of target,
was fraudulently defeated by competitor, and thus sold out its previously acquired shares
in absence of merger by target and competitor). See also Allico Nat'1 Corp. v. Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. America, 397 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1968)
1972]
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Milstein, merely seeks prophylactic relief.3 7 But the court reasoned
that, since Congress found it necessary to enact section 14(e), the anti-
fraud provision dealing with section 14(d) disclosures, it was clear that
a target corporation had no independent standing under rule lOb-5 to
contest a fraudulent report, absent a purchase or sale by it of its securi-
ties. "This same reasoning is just as meaningful in the framework of
section 13(d)." 38 If the Second Circuit is correct in assuming that
section 14(e) is necessary to give an issuer standing to contest violations
of section 14(d), the absence of a comparable provision under section
13 would be strong grounds for denying GAF standing under section
13(d) and for relegating plaintiff to its state remedies for contesting
fraudulent disclosures.3 9 If, however, section 14(e) were merely declara-
tory of an issuer's standing to contest a fraudulent takeover,40 then an
issuer would have standing under section 14(d) even if section 14(e)
had never been enacted. No negative inference with respect to standing
(fraudulent breach by seller of executory contract for sale of securities gives defrauded
purchaser standing as a forced seller); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.
1967) (fraudulent breach by prospective purchaser of executory contract for sale of securities
gives defrauded seller standing as forced purchaser).
37 See, e.g., Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) (com-
plaint alleging controlling stockholder fraudulently kept dividends at a minimum to force
minority stockholders to sell out at depressed values stated a claim under rule lob-5 for
injunctive relief, but not for damages in absence of actual sale by minority stockholder-
plaintiff).
The Second Circuit, oddly enough, cited Mutual Shares Corp. in support of the
proposition that GAF had standing to seek prophylactic relief under section 13(d) but
not under 10(b)l 453 F.2d at 720 n.22.
s8 453 F.2d at 722.
39 The court noted this argument but rejected it, reasoning that, since a tender offer
involves communications to shareholders, whereas a section 13(d) disclosure does not, a
general anti-fraud provision under section 14(e) was mandated. Id. at 720 n22. The court
seems to have lost sight of the fact that the purpose and effect of a section 13(d) report
is to communicate a shareholder's position not only to the SEC but also to the issuer, who
was the plaintiff here.
40This position was rejected by the Second Circuit in Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). In granting a non-tendering
shareholder and the target company standing under section 14(e), the court stated:
§ 14(e) [iWn effect... applies Rule lob-5 both to the offeror and to the opposition
-very likely, except perhaps for any bearing it may have on the issue of standing,
only a codification of existing case law.
409 F.2d at 940 (emphasis added). The court went on to say:
While a nontenderer suffers no immediate injury from inadequacy of price in the
sense that he retains his stock, such inadequacy is likely to have a depressing
effect on the market for some time and thus may hurt him if, for one reason
or another, he should later find it necessary or desirable to sell. Such depression
may also harm the target corporation if it should wish to engage in financing or
acquisitions....
Id. at 946.
The same reasoning should give the issuer a sufficient interest to seek at least injunc-
tive relief under lob-5. Compare Newman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] CCH FEm. SEC. L. Rn?. 92,591 (N.D. IM. 1969) (nontendering shareholder given




under section 10(b) could, therefore, be drawn by the absence of such
a provision in section 13.
The Second Circuit also based its denial of standing under rule
10b-5 on the ground that, if otherwise, issuers would be permitted to
seek more than just prophylactic relief. Thus, the court intimated that
only prophylactic relief is available under the Williams Act. In Grow
Chemical Corp. v. Uran,41 cited with approval by the court of appeals,42
a purchaser of securities was given standing under sections 13(d) and
16(a)43 to recover damages for the excessive price he had paid (he would
have paid less had he known defendant had a 10 percent interest in the
issuer). Clearly, limiting standing to the provisions of the Williams Act
will not limit relief where damages are appropriate. Hence, such rea-
soning by the court provides no justification for denying an issuer
standing under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. The true reason may
simply be that there is no need for such standing. In view of the fact
that section 13(d) will permit an issuer to seek both prophylactic and
compensatory relief in a federal forum, the court can provide an ade-
quate remedy against violations of the Williams Act without discarding
the Birnbaum doctrine. 44
In holding that section 13(d) of the Williams Act requires dis-
closure on the formation of a group of shareholders where their aggre-
gate holdings exceed 10 percent of a particular class of securities, and
where no further acquisitions are intended, the Second Circuit was
faithful to the legislative purpose of alerting the marketplace to poten-
tial shifts in the locus of voting control. However, the court's inability
to develop a consistent 45 rationale for denying standing to the issuer,
41316 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
42 453 F.2d at 719 n.21.
43 Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970) provides:
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than
10 per centum of any class of any equity security (other than an exempted security)
which is registered pursuant to section 781 of this title, or who is a director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of
such security on a national securities exchange or by the effective date of a regis-
tration statement filed pursuant to section 781(g) of this title, or within ten days
after he becomes such beneficial owner, director, or officer, a statement with the
Commission (and, if such security is registered on a national securities exchange,
also with the exchange) of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of
which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each
calendar month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during
such month, shall file with the Commission (and if such security is registered on
a national security exchange, shall also file with the exchange), a statement indi-
cating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes in his
ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
44 See notes 34-36 supra.
45 One author argues that:
[w]hile consideration may have been given to problems of proof of causation and
damages in evolving a "purchaser-seller requirement", particularly, as the poten-
tiality of proof problems in such actions may have been weighed in light of
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
under the 1934 Act's general anti.fraud section, might prompt it to
re-evaluate the purchaser-seller rule in view of the recognized injury to
issuer and shareholder alike resulting from false Williams Act filings. 46
AN EXCHANGE PURSUANT TO A MERGER- NOT A 16(b) SALE
Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.
Section 16(b) 47 of the Securities Exchange Act of 198448 provides
that a corporation may recover from a statutory insider 49 any profit
made on its stock which is sold within six months of purchase. Despite
an ostensibly clear purpose of preventing insiders from using their
status to acquire information that will enable them to realize specula-
tive profits through short-swing trading in the equity securities of their
corporations, the section has had "both a litigious and controversial
history."50
In Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,5 1 the Second Circuit
was required to decide whether a tender offeror who derives a substan-
tial profit from a defensive merger by the target corporation should be
subject to section 16(b) liability. In exempting two profitable trans-
actions, the court found no possibility for speculative abuse in appel-
potentially unlimited liability, it is submitted that such proof problems ought
not to be considered at the outset on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing to
sue.
Kellogg, supra note 35, at 116.
46 See note 40 supra.
47 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
48 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 amended the
Securities Act of 1934 and, for purposes of analysis, can be divided into two parts.
The main feature of [the first] portion is an extension of the registration, periodic
reporting, proxy and insider trading provisions of sections 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the
Exchange Act to larger over-the-counter companies. These provisions were formerly
applicable only to listed companies.... The second part of the act deals primarily
with broker-dealers in securities and their personnel. It imposes upon such persons
increased qualifications standards, as well as strengthened and refined administrative
discplinary controls.
R. PhilAps and M. Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
1964 DuI. LJ. 706-07 (1964), These amendments "constitute the most significant items of
federal securities legislation since" 1940. Id. at 706.
49 The term statutory insider applies to any
person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum
of any class of any equity (other than an exempted security) which is registered
pursuant to [section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], or who is a director
or an officer of the issuer of such security.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
50 Bateman, The Pragmatic Interpretation of Section 16(b) and the Need for Clarifi-
cation, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 772 (1971) [hereinafter Bateman]. The author, in tracing the
development of the current pragmatic interpretation of section 16(b) indicates that while
most cases adopting this interpretive method have been clear in pointing out that 16(b)
should be interpreted in the light of its purposes, these same courts have not been clear
in discerning exactly what those purposes are, Despite an ostensible clarity of purpose
within the statutory language, there remains unpredictability in the decisions.
51 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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